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Abstract 
Key distribution is critical for the practicality of any public key cryptosystem and identity-based encryption (IBE) 
system. When new users register on the PKG, it is important for him/her to obtain his/her private key safely. In this 
paper, we propose a solution to deal with this problem without smart cards or a third service. We subjoin a user’s 
private master key using authentication message, by which users can validate the registration information and make 
sure the security of the protocol based on WDH assumption. We prove that the protocol proposed in this paper can 
defend the Key Compromise Impersonation (KCI) and Key replicating Attack (KRA). 
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1. Introduction
In the distributed network, remote users can easily share important information or resources with each
other via the Internet services provided by an increasing numbers of application servers. These important 
information or resources are usually restricted to the access for some legal privileged users with public 
key cryptosystem. So it is important for a new user to obtain his/her private key safely especially in 
identity-based encryption (IBE) system. 
Although there are numbers of authentication protocols can solve this problem. In 1981, Lamport 
proposed a password authentication scheme using a one-way hash function [4]. Lamport’s scheme is 
simple an efficient in practice, but it suffers from the replay attack and the impersonation attack caused by 
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modifying or stealing the hashed password table maintained by the server [10]. To eliminate such security 
weakness, several password authentication schemes have been proposed in the past decade [12, 15]. But 
all of these protocols are based on smart cards or password. For a remote user, the protocols based on 
smart cards are very inconvenient, and the protocols based on password are not strong enough. 
The concept of identity-based cryptography was first proposed in 1984 by Shamir [2]. But it was not 
until 2001, that a fully functional secure IBE scheme has been designed by Boneh and Franklin [5] using 
bilinear maps. Later, many related papers were published. In 2008, Karatop et al. [1] first proposed a 
registration protocol without smart cards but with a third service named RA for identity-based 
cryptography. In their paper, the RA is take part in the phase encrypted by IBE between user and PKG. 
But their protocol did not solve the key exchanging problem between user and PKG, and it is unnecessary 
to increase hardware to ensure the safety of information. In 2010, we proposed a registration and key 
distribution protocol without a third service [13]. But in [13], the security of the protocol is based on IBE 
system which increases the complexity and reduces the efficiency of the protocol. In this paper, we 
propose a new key distribution protocol based on WDH assumption, and make it more effective. 
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives brief information about the 
underlying definitions and the security attributes of authenticated key agreement. In Section 3, a new 
protocol is introduced. In Section 4, the security and performance of our scheme are analyzed. Finally, we 
present the conclusion. 
2. Preliminaries 
2.1. Bilinear Map pairing 
Let G1 and G2 be two cyclic groups of order q for some large prime q. In our system, G1 is the group of 
points of an elliptic curve over Fp and G2 is a subgroup of p  Therefore, we view G1 as an additive group 
and G2 as a multiplicative group. A map: G1*G1→G2 is said to be bilinear if ê (aP, bQ) =ê (P, Q)ab for all 
P, Q ∈G1 and all a, b ∈Z. The two most important pairings of Bilinear Map in ECC [8] (Elliptic Curves 
Cryptography) are the Tate [6, 9] pairings and the Weil pairings [7, 11], and in this paper we use Weil 
pairings for discussing, and it is the same in Tate pairing based scheme. 
*
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2.2. Weil Diffie-Hellman Assumption (WDH) 
A bilinear map ê: G1*G1→G2 for which the following assumption holds: There is no efficient 
algorithm to compute ê (P, P)abc ∈G2 from P, aP, bP, cP∈G1 where a, b, c∈Z. We note that this WDH 
assumption implies that the Diffie-Hellman problem is hard in the group G1. 
3. Our proposed protocol 
We proposed a new registration and key distribution protocol. Taking Alice’s registration and key 
distribution in Fig 1 as example, we will introduce our proposed new authentication and key agreement 
protocol.  
1: PKG chooses a large k-bit prime p such that p=2mod3 and p=6q−1 for some prime q>3. Let E be 
the elliptic curve defined by y2=x3+1 over Fp. Choose an arbitrary P∈E/Fp of order q. Pick a random 
number s∈Zq and set Ppub= sP. Choose a cryptographic hash function H: p  for some n. 
Choose a cryptographic hash function G :{ 0, 1}*→Fp. The message space is M= {0, 1}n. The ciphertext 
space is C=E/Fp× {0,1}n. The system parameters are params=<p, n, P, Ppub, G, H>. The master-key is s∈
Zq. 
nF }1,0{2 →
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2: Alice picks a random number xA as a part of his private key, and sends his registered information to 
PKG by follow steps: 
a) Alice computes: PA= xAP as the authentication when she login the IBE system and chooses a∈Zq 
randomly. Then Alice computes c=H(aPA) and sends aPA and QA the public key of Alice to PKG. 
b) PKG computes d=H(PAlice)=H(aPA) and chooses b from Zq randomly. Then PKG computes: TP=bP, 
and sends TP to Alice. 
3: Alice computes: k1=e (cPPub, axATP). 
4: PKG computes: k2=e (bPAlice, dPPub). 
5: The shared secret session key is: K=H(QA||PPub||k1)=H(QA ||PPub||k2). 
6: PKG sends the private key sQA to Alice by encryption with K. 
 
 
Fig.1. the process of registration and private key distribution 
4. Analysis 
4.1. Forward secrecy 
The compromise of both party’s long-term partial private key, i.e. A of Alice and s  of PKG, gives no 
information about any previously established session keys. Suppose Eve knows all the long-term partial 
private keys . To extract a past session key, he must compute  from P , AaP ,   and 
P . But he could not get the knowledge of a and b. Without the knowledge, this is exactly an instance of 
the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem that Eve is not able to solve. 
x
s} ,{xA PabsxA PxAT
4.2. Known-key secrecy 
Each run of the protocol between Alice and PKG shall produce a unique session key which depends on 
every particular ephemeral private key a and b of Alice and PKG. Even if the adversary Eve has learned 
some other session keys, he cannot compute the keying point  form them , 
because when he has no access to a, b, s and xA, he faces the computational Diffie-Hellman problem 
which is believed to have no polynomial time algorithm to compute. Hence our protocol has the property 
of known-key security. 
PabsxA sP ,aP bP, P,x AA
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4.3. No Key control 
As has been pointed out in [14, 15], if in a key agreement protocol the responder (PKG) will receive 
the key component of the initiator (accordingly, PKG) before he send out his own component, he can 
always gain an unfair advantage over his counterpart on controlling the value of the shared session key. 
Therefore, like most of the existing protocol, our protocol does not possess the full key control property. 
To avoid this weakness, as suggested in [3], we need to use commitments, which require an extra round. 
4.4. Key compromise impersonation attack on the protocol 
We assume that an adversary (say Eve) has learned the private key of Alice. Eve could establish a 
session with Alice while masquerading as Bob; this is known as key compromise impersonation (KCI). 
In order to demonstrate an efficient key compromise impersonation attack, we assume that an 
adversary Eve (learned the private key of Alice in advance, xA) want to impersonate PKG to Alice. Eve 
can complete his attack by randomly choosing b�Zq and sending TPKG=bP to Alice, at the same time, he 
declaring his identity as PKG. 
We note that although Eve could establish xAP for knowing xA, he would not get a because it has been 
encrypted by aPA. So Eve cannot make agreement with Alice. 
4.5. Key replacing attack on the protocol 
Key replicating attack is one form of the man-in-the-middle attacks. An active adversary can intercept 
and properly modify the messages exchange between two parties, and force two parties to accept the same 
session key which is not the one that two parties really want to agree on. Key replicating attack destroys 
integrity of the key.  
Illustration of an execution of the protocols in the presence of a malicious adversary Eve is as below: 
1.Alice→PKG: < TA=aPA > 
The adversary Eve intercepts and deletes the message from Alice, computes TA’=rTA with a random r
∈Zq and sends< TA’=rTA=arPA > . 
1. Eve(Alice)→PKG: < TA’ > 
2. PKG→Alice:<TP> 
The adversary Eve intercepts and delete the message from PKG, computes TP’=rTP with a random r∈
Zq and sends < TP’=rTP> to Alice impersonating PKG. 
2. Eve(PKG)→Alice:< TP’> 
Alice and PKG compute the session key K1 and K2 respectively: 
K1=e(cPPub, axATP’) 
K2=e(bPAlice, dPPub) 
It is obvious that K1 is not equal to K2 because of the c and d computed by the hash function not equal. 
The attack is aborted. 
5. Conclusion 
Through researching the existing IBE schemes, key agreement protocols, and authentication schemes, 
we proposed this protocol to make sure the security of the key distribution for new user. We use WDH 
assume to ensure the data transmitted when registration can be authentication. Then we proved that this 
protocol is invulnerable to KCI and KRA. 
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